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1 Introduction
When I was invited to speak at the IDS fortieth
anniversary conference, I was asked to be both
challenging and brief. So in the short space available
now for this article, I must be selective. In order to
do that, I need to make you aware of two of my
preconceptions.
The first is my belief that what once was called
development research is, in fact, an attempt at both
the theory and practice of cosmopolitanism. By
cosmopolitanism, I mean the effort to make the
world a more hospitable place for all its citizens. But
I also believe that the language, the semiotics of
development today is an obstacle to engaging in the
theory and practice of cosmopolitanism.
My second preconception is to believe that there will
be no cosmopolitanism in this century unless it is
green – or, you can forget about fighting for global
fairness if you choose not to be an environmentalist.
I am fully conscious of how, over the last two or three
decades, the environment has become an add-on to
everything but in contrast to that, I would argue that
environmentalism is key to successfully tackling a host
of conventional development issues, such as economic
growth, equity, human rights and wellbeing. 
The next sections divide my reflections into five points.
Section 2 discusses the special case of European
development and Section 3, the bifurcation of
development. Section 4 is about the post-development
era; Section 5 about contraction and convergence and
Section 6 reviews sustainable prosperity.
2 Europe: the special case
When I reflect on Europe, I always want to ask the
age-old question: Why was Europe able to leap
ahead of the rest of the world when it did?
Historians and theoreticians have come up with a
range of answers: Europe has benefited from an
entrepreneurial spirit, it benefited from its liberal
institutions, from its diversity, from its temperate
climate. But I want to focus instead on what you
might call an ‘environmental hypothesis’, first
suggested, I think, by Kenneth Pomeranz in his book
about the great divergence between the West and
the rest, and in particular, China. Pomeranz
wondered how and why Britain succeeded in moving
ahead of China, given the fact that in the late
eighteenth century, China was roughly equal in its
potential to Europe, and Britain was roughly equal to
the area of the Yangzi Delta.
Pomeranz points out that both economies were
facing similar constraints at that time – which was
that both societies were pushing at the limits of
their growth and were particularly constrained by
scarcity of land. In Europe, this was translating into
scarcity of wool, timber and other resources. Similar
things were happening in China, where land was so
scarce it was not possible to grow enough food and
fodder or produce enough fibre or fuel.
So how did Britain succeed in overcoming these
resource constraints? There are in fact two reasons,
the first being that Britain was able to tap into the
crust of the earth to exploit coal for industrial
purposes (and at that time, one ton of coal was
approximately equivalent to five acres of sustainable
timber production). The second reason was that
Britain was able to reach out to foreign countries
and to import massive amounts of agricultural goods
from the New World, from the Caribbean, from the
north-east of Brazil, from the south of today’s USA,
giving Britain access to timber, sugar, tobacco and
many other products. Put simply, in the 1830s and
1840s, Britain had access to more than double its
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own arable land outside its own borders. In a
nutshell, Britain was successful because it has access
to mineral resources from the crust of the earth and
to biotic resources from the colonies.
Carbon and colonies made everything else possible –
in other words industrial society would not exist in
today’s shape, had not resources been mobilised
from both the depths of geological time and the
expanse of geographical space. These were the
special conditions that brought about the rise of the
Euro–Atlantic civilisation.
3 A bifurcated choice for the future
In hindsight, Europe’s development path turns out to
be a special case; it cannot be repeated everywhere
and any time. For the wealth of fossil and renewable
raw materials at Europe’s disposal in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries is no longer available. Today
that resource bonanza is over and we are facing not
only the end of the era of cheap oil but also climate
chaos – and ‘climate chaos’ is the only precise term
for it, as ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ are
only euphemisms. Furthermore, the colonies no
longer exist, so large developing countries need to
turn inward to create their own domestic colonies if
they want to exploit land resources as Britain did
200 years ago.
So there is a crisis coming our way – and one we are
well aware of. China is the most visible example of
where we stand in the scramble for carbon and
colonies today. The rise of China is a success in terms
of development, in terms of economic growth and
in terms of reducing the number of people living in
absolute poverty. But it is a bittersweet success,
because we already see dwindling water reserves,
shrinking crop fields, soil erosion and other
environmental consequences. It is clear how much
China is going to weigh on the rest of the world, as
it goes around like a vacuum cleaner sucking up
resources in Latin America and in Africa and in parts
of Asia; be it copper from Chile, oil from West Africa
or soya beans from Brazil. We are facing a crunch
situation – that using this model exiting from
underdevelopment and poverty implies entering an
environmental robber economy. That is the dilemma
and no-one has any clear notion of how we can
move forward.
It should be apparent that the European model of
wealth generation and accumulation, which
happened in historically exceptional conditions,
cannot be transferred to the rest of the world. In
other words, the model is structurally incapable of
justice, so it is unwise to look at industrial patterns of
production and consumption as we know them, as a
standard for equity. It is difficult to see how the
automobile society can be democratised across the
world; it is difficult to see how chemically dependent
agriculture can be replicated; it is difficult to see how
a meat-based food system can be generalised. The
resources required for extending and democratising
this kind of wealth are too vast, they are too
expensive, and they are too damaging for local and
for global ecosystems.
This thus presents us with the bifurcation I mentioned
above, and which I see in the following way. Either
wellbeing remains confined to a minority because the
prevailing styles of production and consumption
cannot be generalised across the globe or sustainable
models of wellbeing take hold, opening the
opportunity for sufficient prosperity for all. Since both
affluence and equity cannot be attained, one can
either opt for affluence along with oligarchy or for
sufficiency along with equity. Seen from this
perspective, the choice between destructive and
sustainable models of wealth is not so much a choice
which separates the exploiter of nature from the
lover of nature as it is a choice which separates the
elitist from the democrat. In any case, production and
consumption patterns will not be capable of justice
unless they are resource-light and compatible with
living systems. In the twenty-first century, there will
be no equity without ecology.
4 The post-development era
What are the implications of this for development
research? First, development – for the last 50–60
years (at least) the conceptual cornerstone of the
development discourse has been to link the pursuit
of justice to the idea of development. For many
well-intentioned people, development meant to get
ahead, to aspire to the same level as the more
powerful countries and peoples. The development
ideal has come to mean expanded participation in
economic growth – that famous metaphor of the
rising tide lifting all our boats. That was the hope for
development – that with increasing growth it would
be possible to solve the issue of equity.
But the emergence of biophysical limits has brought
us into a different arena. Growth has lost its
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innocence and as long as the desire for justice and
for recognition is linked to growth, we can expect a
collision with bio-spherical stability. For decades,
conventional development has defined equity as
being a problem of the poor. Development experts
used to highlight the lack of income, the lack of
market access, the lack of capacity. To address this,
development has advocated remedies to raise living
standards – all kinds of solutions to raise the floor,
but rarely have development experts spoken about
modifying or even bringing down the ceiling. We
often speak about equity in terms of the poor, while
it is clear that given the biophysical limits of growth
we now face, it is the rich and their economy that
has to be called into question. In a nutshell, poverty
alleviation cannot be separated from wealth
alleviation. Anyone who speaks of poverty alleviation
without wealth alleviation is, I suggest, someone we
should rightly be suspicious of.
5 Contraction and convergence
The notion of contraction and convergence comes
from climate policy, but needs to be considered from
a much broader perspective. Contraction and
convergence is, I suggest, a model that speaks about
two paths of evolution. On the one hand it speaks
about the global North, which puts considerable
strains on its use of the global environmental space.
And it is also clear from an equity point of view that
no people or country can be permitted to take a
disproportionate share of the environmental space
because it is quite simply unjust to have institutional
patterns of resource-use based on rules that cannot
also be adopted by other countries.
In order to achieve global environmental justice, we
must therefore promote a retreat by the North from
its excessive use of environmental space. Contraction
of resource consumption, therefore, is the trajectory
of contraction upon which the North will have to
embark. What it would mean for a country like
Germany, for example, to become sustainable in
ecological terms or in terms of equity, is that we
would need to think about a reduction of 80–90 per
cent in the consumption of fossil resources. And if
we are serious about development, we must make
that the mainstay of our policy – to persuade the
North to weigh much more lightly on the planet.
A second area which development research must
address is convergence. You might think those who
have not enjoyed the same use of environmental
space are entitled to have more; are entitled to
increase their resource-use; are entitled to move a
little way above the dignity line. Yes, developing
countries need to have the space to realise their
ideas of a flourishing society, although it cannot be
imagined that this increase can mimic the trajectory
taken in the past by Northern countries. It can be a
rise but it will have to flatten out much sooner
(relatively) until all countries are in a common
corridor with sustainable rates of resource-use.
This, in summary, is the model of contraction and
convergence. It follows directly from thinking about
post-development, reconceptualising justice in an
age after development.
6 Sustainable prosperity
When we look back at what was made possible by
the availability of carbon and colonies, we see that
they made it possible to build a material world which
is largely independent of particular places, of
particular seasons, of particular bodies. Architecture
and agriculture provide the best examples. Modern
buildings are typically built of glass and concrete,
materials that are not connected to any specific
place. Modern settlements are usually laid out along
a grid of highways, disregarding both landscape and
historical ways of living. Furthermore, modern crop
cultivation, following a single-crop mentality,
replaces local biodiversity with artificial nutrients and
pesticides in favour of a more ecosystem-
independent production. However, we are paying a
heavy price for this placeless, timeless, lifeless
functionality. The lack of local fit – the lack of
adaptation has to be paid for with huge amounts of
energy and imported materials. Buildings that
disregard the sun require artificial heating or cooling.
Plants that are cultivated outside of season require
glasshouses, transport, energy. And so it goes on.
When regarding sustainable prosperity, apart from
looking for new alternative technologies like wind
energy; flushless toilets; low-speed travel or an
indigenous food production system, I am implying
that a resource-light, a solar economy will not come
into being without a new appreciation for places,
contexts and times. To make human systems fit with
natural conditions is most aptly done by connecting
them to local materials and energy flows. Sustainable
prosperity calls for both technical and sociocultural
alternatives – it calls for creating innovations and
experiments in many places, linked by a common
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awareness for the finiteness of the earth, but diverse
in their technical and cultural styles.
In conclusion, the quest for justice in the world,
which is often hidden behind development speak,
calls for a transition to sustainable, resource-light
forms of prosperity. For the more affluent classes in
North and South, that implies a reversal in thinking
about justice: it is not so important to learn how to
give more, but to learn how to take less.
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